Slightly generalized Generalized Contagion: Unifying simple models of biological and social spreading

We motivate and explore the basic features of generalized contagion, a model mechanism that unifies fundamental models of biological and social contagion. Generalized contagion builds on the elementary observation that spreading and contagion of all kinds involve some form of system memory. We discuss the three main classes of systems that generalized contagion affords, resembling: simple biological contagion; critical mass contagion of social phenomena; and an intermediate, and explosive, vanishing critical mass contagion. We also present a simple explanation of the global spreading condition in the context of a small seed of infected individuals.Comment: 8 pages, 5 figures; chapter to appear in "Spreading Dynamics in Social Systems"; Eds. Sune Lehmann and Yong-Yeol Ahn, Springer Natur

The microfoundations of territorial disputes: Evidence from a survey experiment in Japan

Although territorial disputes are one of the most fraught issues among states, how public opinion on territorial disputes varies within states and what explains the variation are often overlooked. This paper argues that citizens who prioritize economic considerations are more likely to support compromises over such disputes, while those who prioritize a country’s reputation tend to reject any compromise. Further, the paper hypothesizes that such variation in individual preferences can be explained by proximity to disputed territories. Counterintuitively, residents closer to disputes are more likely to support a compromise than those who live further away, because they are more affected by economic considerations. Those far from the disputed territory can afford to focus on its political aspects, which leads to a more hawkish stance. By using an experimental approach within Japan, this paper examines the validity of the spatial argument, and tests the relative salience of economic and political aspects of territorial disputes. The findings, based on original survey data, show that distance from disputed territories shapes individual preferences, and under some conditions, people living further away from disputed territories are more hawkish

A gauge invariant chiral unitary framework for kaon photo- and electroproduction on the proton

We present a gauge invariant approach to photoproduction of mesons on nucleons within a chiral unitary framework. The interaction kernel for meson-baryon scattering is derived from the chiral effective Lagrangian and iterated in a Bethe-Salpeter equation. Within the leading order approximation to the interaction kernel, data on kaon photoproduction from SAPHIR, CLAS and CBELSA/TAPS are analyzed in the threshold region. The importance of gauge invariance and the precision of various approximations in the interaction kernel utilized in earlier works are discussed.Comment: 23 pages, 13 figs, EPJ A styl

Simulating complex social behaviour with the genetic action tree kernel

The concept of genetic action trees combines action trees with genetic algorithms. In this paper, we create a multi-agent simulation on the base of this concept and provide the interested reader with a software package to apply genetic action trees in a multi-agent simulation to simulate complex social behaviour. An example model is introduced to conduct a feasibility study with the described method. We find that our library can be used to simulate the behaviour of agents in a complex setting and observe a convergence to a global optimum in spite of the absence of stable states

Dynamics of Transformation from Segregation to Mixed Wealth Cities

We model the dynamics of the Schelling model for agents described simply by a continuously distributed variable - wealth. Agents move to neighborhoods where their wealth is not lesser than that of some proportion of their neighbors, the threshold level. As in the case of the classic Schelling model where segregation obtains between two races, we find here that wealth-based segregation occurs and persists. However, introducing uncertainty into the decision to move - that is, with some probability, if agents are allowed to move even though the threshold level condition is contravened - we find that even for small proportions of such disallowed moves, the dynamics no longer yield segregation but instead sharply transition into a persistent mixed wealth distribution. We investigate the nature of this sharp transformation between segregated and mixed states, and find that it is because of a non-linear relationship between allowed moves and disallowed moves. For small increases in disallowed moves, there is a rapid corresponding increase in allowed moves, but this tapers off as the fraction of disallowed moves increase further and finally settles at a stable value, remaining invariant to any further increase in disallowed moves. It is the overall effect of the dynamics in the initial region (with small numbers of disallowed moves) that shifts the system away from a state of segregation rapidly to a mixed wealth state. The contravention of the tolerance condition could be interpreted as public policy interventions like minimal levels of social housing or housing benefit transfers to poorer households. Our finding therefore suggests that it might require only very limited levels of such public intervention - just sufficient to enable a small fraction of disallowed moves, because the dynamics generated by such moves could spur the transformation from a segregated to mixed equilibrium.Comment: 12 pages, 7 figure

Segregation discovery in a social network of companies

We introduce a framework for a data-driven analysis of segregation of minority groups in social networks, and challenge it on a complex scenario. The framework builds on quantitative measures of segregation, called segregation indexes, proposed in the social science literature. The segregation discovery problem consists of searching sub-graphs and sub-groups for which a reference segregation index is above a minimum threshold. A search algorithm is devised that solves the segregation problem. The framework is challenged on the analysis of segregation of social groups in the boards of directors of the real and large network of Italian companies connected through shared directors

The Naming Game in Social Networks: Community Formation and Consensus Engineering

We study the dynamics of the Naming Game [Baronchelli et al., (2006) J. Stat. Mech.: Theory Exp. P06014] in empirical social networks. This stylized agent-based model captures essential features of agreement dynamics in a network of autonomous agents, corresponding to the development of shared classification schemes in a network of artificial agents or opinion spreading and social dynamics in social networks. Our study focuses on the impact that communities in the underlying social graphs have on the outcome of the agreement process. We find that networks with strong community structure hinder the system from reaching global agreement; the evolution of the Naming Game in these networks maintains clusters of coexisting opinions indefinitely. Further, we investigate agent-based network strategies to facilitate convergence to global consensus.Comment: The original publication is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/70370l311m1u0ng3

The Emergence of Consensus: a primer

The origin of population-scale coordination has puzzled philosophers and scientists for centuries. Recently, game theory, evolutionary approaches and complex systems science have provided quantitative insights on the mechanisms of social consensus. This paper overviews the main dimensions over which the debate has unfolded and discusses some representative results, with a focus on those situations in which consensus emerges `spontaneously' in absence of centralised institutions. Covered topics include the macroscopic consequences of the different microscopic rules of behavioural contagion, the role of social networks, and the mechanisms that prevent the formation of a consensus or alter it after it has emerged. Special attention is devoted to the recent wave of experiments on the emergence of consensus in social systems

The Epidemics of Donations: Logistic Growth and Power-Laws

This paper demonstrates that collective social dynamics resulting from individual donations can be well described by an epidemic model. It captures the herding behavior in donations as a non-local interaction between individual via a time-dependent mean field representing the mass media. Our study is based on the statistical analysis of a unique dataset obtained before and after the tsunami disaster of 2004. We find a power-law behavior for the distributions of donations with similar exponents for different countries. Even more remarkably, we show that these exponents are the same before and after the tsunami, which accounts for some kind of universal behavior in donations independent of the actual event. We further show that the time-dependent change of both the number and the total amount of donations after the tsunami follows a logistic growth equation. As a new element, a time-dependent scaling factor appears in this equation which accounts for the growing lack of public interest after the disaster. The results of the model are underpinned by the data analysis and thus also allow for a quantification of the media influence